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This thesis is an unclassified examination from a
Western perspective^ of the current and projected space
efforts of the uiorld and hooi they effect current U.S. Space
Policy. There is currently no universally accepted space
strategy to help in meeting the policy goals of the United
States. It is the hypothesis of this thesis that the
strategies needed to deal effectively oiith future space
development were layed doujn in the past by Alfred Thayer
Mahan and others. In order to outline a current strategy an
analysis was conducted of current space programs; future
space efforts, orb i tology /orb i ta 1 mechanics.- and the
la/ritings of H. Jomini, A. T. Mahan/ and Sir Julian Corbett.
In order to manage and arrange the large knouiledge baser a
systems model was developed and used in this analysis.
Upon the completion of the analysesi a blending of the Mahan
and orbital mechanics was conducted in order to shou>/ by
analogy/ that there exist parallels between that of naval
strategy and strategies needed to reach US policy goals.
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I. Ih4TR0DUCTIQN
As the spacefaring nations of the ujorld race pell-mell
into the twenty-first century in their quest for quick-
solutions to complex problems/ one has to ask what it is
that guides all this activity? For some* space is a theater
to be controlled/ while for others it is a place of hope
where the problems of over population and resource depletion
can be studied and somehow managed/ and for still others it
is a combination of the two.
Through treaty and policy statements the United States
of America falls into the latter category. The rational for
this is stated in the US National objectives which pertain
to space CRef . 1
:
p. 23;
1. Strengthen the security of the United States.
2. Maint-ain US Space leadership.
3. Obtain Economic/ Scientific benefits through
exploitation of space.
4. Expand US private sector investment and
involvement in civil space/space related
activities.
5. Promote international cooperative activities
which are in the national interest.
6. Cooperate with other nations in maintaining
the freedom of space for activities which
enhance the security and welfare of mankind.
The Sovist Union, our chief competitor, has a space
doctrine which is derived from the Marxist-Leninist
dialectic fjjhich states CRef. 2: p. vii3:
The Soviet Armed Forces shall be provided with all the
resources necessary to attain and maintain military
superiority in outer space sufficient both to deny the
use of outer space to other states and assure maximum
space based military support for the Soviet offensive
and defensive combat operations on land* at sea, in air.
and in outer space.
Rationalized thusly CRef. 2:pp. viii].
The current Soviet stance, refusing to admit
the existance of any military element in their space
program can only mean that the Soviet Leadership,
rather than merely countering US moves, is actually
seeking military superiority in outer space for
offensive, as well as defensive purposes.
As can be seen the US Space Policy and "the Soviet Space
Doctrine are loosely in parallel when describing the need
for national security. The first sign of divergence is in
item two where the US has stated that it will be the
technological leader in all fields of space endeavor, while
the Soviet Union has but one goal, which is the support of
its military. The final point leaves the US with a paradox.
The paradox lies in the fact that the United States, by
policy statement, has agreed to maintain the freedom of
space to a nation that is working for systematic denial of
this crucial arena to US and other international
interests. It is to this problem that this thesis will
address itself.
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While the US ha-5 a space policy/ it does not currently
possess a space doctrine. In the absence o-f a formal
doctrinal statement the US Air Force has created a
combination Aero-Space doctrine oihichi by its own admission,
fails short o-f meeting the goals o-f the US Space Policy
declaration C Ref. 3: pp. 13-243. If the only existing
doctrine falls short, then loihere are the guiding strategies
for the implementation of the US Space Program? It is the
hypothesis of this thesis that the strategies needed to
fulfill the policy goals, as set forth by the US Government
have already been laid douin in the fundamental * doctrines
of H. Jomini, A. T. Mahan, -Sir J. S. Corbett, and others. By
looking at their guiding axioms it is hoped that through
•an-alogy ** an infinite variety ->»••;* of options will become
available for use. It is this requisite variety which will
•* Fundamental doctrine is grounded in an examination of
history, and it applies in all oper-ating mediums in any
nation. Instantly recognized as elements of fundamental
doctrine are purposes of the military, the nature of war,
and the relationship of the military to other national
instruments of power. Since fundamental doctrine is
characterized by its timeless significance and universal
application, it is rarely, if ever, rewritten in response to
technological change CRef. 4: pp. 40-48].
^* Analogy is a first order approximation of unlike
Ob jec ts.
•*** Variety in this sense, is as mentioned in J. G.
Taylor's work on the , "Initial Concepts of Soviet Command
and Control" CRef. 53, when he quotes Terekov C1983, p. 1723
as saying, " Variety ... is created by the presence of
reserves, surplus of both information and also physical
characteristics ... Without reserves and redundancy
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allow the US to meet its policy goals while at the same time
insuring it will not be cutof-f -from outer space.
In attempting to prove the above hypothesis/ a systems
model (as first described fay C. West Churchman) will be
utilized to organize and handle the volume of information in
existence. CRef. 6: pp. 8-103. The model was chosen for its
ability to integrate disparate volumes of knowledge into a
system *. One of the benefits of this method is the ability
to test the entire undifferentiated •»* knowledge base in
order to make a determination as to how it affects the
system design/ thereby giving some degree of confidence as
to the systems validity. Once the system is integrated/ one
will be able to observe the synergistic effect of all its
parts working in concert. This synergistic effect is what
creates the appropriate strategy/ which is another rational
for choosing integration **•* over further differentiation.
effective control in the presence of random disturbances is
unreal i zab le" .
•» A system is defined as a set of parts coordinated to
accomplish a set of goals CRef. 4: p. 293.
»•* The obsessive scrutiny/ or further differentiation
of information which is already vast in scope would
hopelessly mire the hypothesis in a morass of superfluous
deta i 1
.
>** Integration is the summing of all the parts in order
to observe their workings as a whole/ whereas
differentiation is the reduction of the system into smaller
and smaller pieces in order to determine their individual
f unc t i ons
.
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The process Q-? differentiation will come later/ as it
should/ u>hen a strategic option is broken down to its
constituent pieces and analyzed to find optimum solutions.
The information base which will be utilized within the
model will include:
1. Current space efforts and trends.
2. Future space analysis.
3. Pre-existing doctrines.
4. Qrbit-al mechanics (an energy perspective).
5. Doctrine management through orbit-al mechanics.
It is not the purpose of this thesis to present a rigorous
analysis of each of these areas/ but more to present them in
such a manner as to give the "reader a, 'flavor'/ for what is




The use o-f the systems model povides a structure by
U/hich an effective discussion of space strategy can fae
achieved. It accomplishes this by organizing large volumes
of disparate information into a coherent frameu/ork. This
framework is created by testing the knowledge base currently
being analysed/ u/hich establishes the relationships of one
body of knowledge to another. In addition* these
relationships/ within the models framework/ allow the
observer to conceptualize the ebb and flow of communications
between various components of the system/ Figure 1.
These communications allow the creation of a variety of
responses needed to fulfill the goals of US Space Policy.
In order to achieve these goals Churchman's model divides
the body of the system into five parts which are as follows
CRef. 61:
1. The objectives of the total system together with
performance measures.
2. The systems environment.
3. The resources of the system.
4 The components of the system.
5. Management of the system.
14
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Each of the above considerations will be taken in turn and
applied to the previously mentioned areas o-P study.
A. OBJECTIVES
Objectives are the goals or ends to which a system tends
CRe-f. 53. This goal seeking/ or teleology * was first
described by Aristotle in his works on» "Han and His
Universe". Churchman takes this concept of teleos and
proposes a principle of primacy. This principle is a way to
distinguish a real from a stated ob.jective by asking whether
a system will knowingly sacrifice other goals to obtain the
stated ob.jective. If the answer is , 'yes'' / then the
stated and real objective are identical.
To apply this test, a restatement of the US Space Policy
is needed* and is as fo'llows CRef. 13:
1. Strengthen the security of the US.
2. M-aintain US Space leadership.
3. Cooperate with other nations in m-aintaining the
freedom of space for activities which enhance
the security and welfare of mankind.
To look at the policy we have to ask whether the US would
knowingly sacrifice statements 2/3 or both to maintain its
stated objective. The answer is believed to be 'yes''. At
this point there is a statement of primacy and the arguments
-> Aristotelian logic views objects as wholes and as such
Bve endowed with intrinsic goals (teleos).
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put -forth previously can be explained using Churchman's
model.
S. THE SYSTEMS ENVrRQtslMENT
The environment includes all that lies outside the
systems control. This at first seems obvious, but the
argument is deeper. The environment in part controls hou)
the system performs. As stated by Schoderbeck in his liicrk
on / "Management Systems" CRef. 6: p. 103/
Soth te-atures must be present simultaneously: the
environment must be beyond the systems control and/
secondly must exert some determination on the systems
performance.
Taking this st-atement and applying it to: (1) Foreign Space
Programs; (2) The Future of Space; (31' Orbital
Mechan ics/Orb i tology ; (4) and Pre-existing Doctrines; it can
be shown that the environmental influences sx'ill consist of
Foreign Space Programs and the Future of Space. For
example: There is little the US can do to influence the
Soviet Union's space program but« it has a direct impact on
US space policy. It is therefore/ environmental.
On the other hand/ orbital mechanics can be manipulated
along with fundamental doctrines to achieve systems goals.
It therefore/ must be something else.
C. RESOURCES
Resources by definition reside u/ithin the system CRefs.
5i62. They are the means available to the system for the
17
e>:ecution ohF activitias necessary iov goal realization.
UJhila fchia thesis will not delve into this aspect of the
modeiy it should be noted that this is truly the
s tronges t /u/eakes t part of the US space policy. Resources
available to the system ars ?und ing/ equipment, people, and
op por tun i t ies
.
D. COMPONENTS
The components of the system ar& the activities the
system must perform in order to meet its goals CRefs. S/i].
It is the contention of this thesis that orbital mechanics
and fundamental doctrines fit into this category. It is
believed that orbital mechanics must be balanced against
strategies and doctrines of Jomini/ Mahan, Corbet; et.ai in
order to achieve the goals o? US space policy. This
previous statement is a paraphrase of Churchman/ u;ho
believed that components when blended together make a
mission. It is therefore/ the goal of the mission
components to achieve the desired objectives CRef. 5:pp.
41-433.
E. MANAGEMENT
In this phase of Churchman's model- management
encompasses tuio basic functions: planning and control of the
system. Planning as stated by Schoderbeck CRef. 6: p. 113/
IS
Planning involves ail aspects o-f the systems previously
encountered/ viz., its goals or objective Sy its.
environment/ "its utilization oi resources/ and its
components or activities.
Control of the system is much more di-fficult as there is the
execution of planning/ plus the added dimension of change.
F. SUMMARY
From the previous discussion of the model it can be seen
hou) the kno IK ledge base has been broken into constituent
parts by Churchman's model. It is through the use of this
model/ and its ability to integrate disparate information
that the hypothesis will be tested. If indeed the
fundamental doctrines of Jomini/ Mahan/ Corbett/ and others
apply to space then our ability to control the system and




The environment as stated has an e-f-fect on the system/
fi/hile the system has no control on the environment. From
this point forfiiard/ the system re-fered to in this paper fiiill
be the Space Policy of the United States. The exploration
u;hich u/iil be conducted 'i/ill try and illustrate the
complexities faced by the United States upon implementation
of its policy within the environment. The environment/
composed of foreign space programs and the future of space/
fiiill provide the backdrop against u/hich a strategic systems
model hopes to be developed. As a precursor for this
discussion it is assumed that the reader has a fundamental
understanding of the US Space Program and its goals for the
next 10 to 15 years.
B FOREIGN SPACE PROGRAMS
The nations that were chosen for this study standout
from the rest of the world operators of satellite equipment
in a number of important ways. First of all/ these nations
have all independently launched vehicles into space. One can
draw from this fact/ that all of the countries possess their
own facilities/ down range tracking sites/ processing
20
aquipmentf and most importantly/ the t<no«i>l9dg8 and
technology base needed to accomplish these feats.
Upon identifying the efforts that have gone into their
individual programs^ an investigative look will be taken
into why these countries have gone to the expense of
fielding these programs. While looking at these ongoing
effortSi this report uiill try and identify current areas of
research and development and what goals can be reached by
putting these projects into orbit. Finally* there will be
an attempt to identify current trends in these programs/ and
how these trends will effect ongoing U.S. efforts in space.
Upon the completion of the current space efforts a look
will be taken as to what scientists/ engineers/ and other
technical diciplines beleave to be the long range future of
outer space development. It is this long range forcast
which when analysed can reduce the uncertainty involved in
implementing a space policy. This will be a critical element
in the reduction of environmentally introduced change which
causes system planning to go awry.
1. China in Space
China/ whose space program has come as a surprise to
many/ is not new to the arena of outerspace. In a study bu
David CRef. 8: p. 253 it was stated that. " China "^s
burgeoning space capability is evidenced by twelve
successful satellite launchings since April of 1970. With
its first satellite/ the Peoples Republic of China became
21
the fi-fth nation—-a-fter the USSR/ USA, France, and Japan—
to launch an arti-ficial satellite using its own launcher. "
In a study on the Chinese space program, Rao CRe-f.
14: pp. 14-173 puts -forth the argument that ujhile China ujould
like to become competitive in the world launcher market
there are many problems to be solved before this becomes a
reality. The most perplexing o-f China's problems is that o-f
an immense population and land mass. To rectify this
deficiency the Peoples Republic of China is importing tu>o
advanced direct broadcasting satellites which are designed
to extend radio and television to all of her one billion
plus population. China also plans to build and launch an
earth resources satellite that will aid in emergencies
(aviation transponders), water conservation, agriculture,
and land use planning.
Both Rao and David CRefs. 8, 143 state that to date
most of the Chinese spacecraft have been designed for either
military surveillance or technological development. With
continued development it is believed by David CRef. 8: p. 253
th-at China could have, "... initial astronaut flights by
the end of the decade. "
2. India in Space
In a country where the bullock cart is still the
primary mode of transportation the push into space seems a
glaring paradox. In a study by Rao CRef. 8:1 6- 193 it is
stated that, " India has been propelled to join the
22
ranks of the space-faring countries by the immense promises
held out by space technology to solve the problems o-f
poverty and faac kuiardness. " This paraphrases nicely the
statement by Professor Satish Dhauisan/ head o-f the Indian
Space Research Organization (ISRQ)/ that/ " The main aim of
the Indian space program is towards the development o-f
communications and earth observation satellite systems
suited to India's needs."
To this end Rao CRe-f. 83 notes that India has made
dramatic breakthroughs in booster technology. The
success-ful -flight o-f the SLV-3 made India the seventh nation
to join the ranks o-f space-faring countries. With the
ability to launch/ India has moved -forward with an
aggressive earth observation satellite program. With one
platform already in orbit/ Bhaskara-i/ the next step will be
an in-fra-red remote sensing satellite (IRS). It is hoped
that the information from these platforms will provide the
needed data to help manage India's agriculture/ forestry/
meteorology/ and hydrology.
Rao CRef. 8D makes further mention of India's
innovative techniques in communications satellites. After a
series of loaner satellites from the United States and
Europe with which India conducted her Satellite
Instructional Television Experiment (SITE)/ ISRQ was able to
create from the combined technologies INSAT-1. INSAT-1
became the world's first 3-axis stabilized/ geo-s tat ionar y
,
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television broadcast) te lecotinmun icat ioni and meteorological
satellite.
Despite some early setbacks fi/ith INSAT-1 India's
space effort continues to be geared tofijards creating the
solutions that tjiill help solve her numerous problems on the
ground.
3. Japan in Space
A nation that has made large strides in the past iPe<jj
years in developing its space program/ is Japan. As stated
by Davis CRef. 8: p. 92 " Japan <i/as the i^ourth country to
launch a satellite/ and the third to successfully launch a
geostationary satellite with their o'^^n vehicle. " From the
preceding observation/ it is seen that Japan is developing a
credible space effort u>hich includes its own tracking,
launch and recovery facilities.
Due to the topographic limitations of an island
nation such as Japan/ the space program has been oriented in
such a way as to alleviate many of these problems. A
further description of the program by Davis CRef. 8] shows
that Japan launched two communicatin satellites/ C3-2A and
C3-2B/ to establish an emergency network for the earthquake
prone islands. In addition to the emergeny systems will be
launches containing operational broadcasting satellites/
BS-2A and 5S-2B/ which will reach the homes of over 500/000
Japanese. In early 1987/ there are plans to launch an
innovative marine observation satellite/ MOS-1/ that will
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produca information i^or use in optimizing Japan's -fishing
industry. It is hoped that the data -from MOS-1 mill create
a 10*i to 20'1 reduction in the current fuel costs for the
fleet.
In a study done on Asia in space/ Radhakrishna Rao
CRef. 143 describes Japan's booster technology efforts.
These efforts are manifested in the National Space and
Development Agency of Japan's (NASDA)i development of the
billion dollar H-2 vehicle, which is described as Japan's
«i;arkhorse of the i990's. Rao CRef. 14: p. 143 further states
that, " The 45 meter H-2 is capable of placing t'oio ton class
spacecraft into geo-s tat ionary orbit/ and u;ill also alloi^j
Japan to compete with both the American space shuttle and
the West European Ariane vehicles for commercial business
from the third world. " His study also shows that Japan is
conducting its own deep space missions with probes to
Halley's comet, and obsevation platforms which can observe
X-ray stars by both optical and radioscopic means.
In an overview of Japan's broad and technologically
advanced program Davis CRef. 83 points out that Japan will
continue to solve the problems unique to an island nation,
while simultaneously advancing her space capabilities
inorder to compete more f-avorably with established space
programs.
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4. Canada in Space
A nation ijjhose space program has made steady
progress but/ whose efforts have been overshadowed by her
southern neighbor, is Canada. Day's study CRef. S:pp. 19-
213/ indicates that Canada became the third nation to
develop/ and orbit a satellite. Alouette 1 (the Lark)/ was
designed as an ionosphere data satellite and continued to
send useful data for over ten years. With proven technology
Day CRef. 83 illustrates that the Canadians set about to
solve their own unique set of problems. With a land mass
second only to the Soviet Union/ Canada's efforts were
directed to solving problems of distance. The solution to
these problems was for Canada to divide her space program
into four distinct areas each with teams devoted to research
and development. The four areas were space sciences/
communication/ remote sensing/ and navigation.
These teams working in concert/ created a burgeoning
space program. In conquering the "communications distance
problem', Day CRef. 8: p. 203 states that, " Virtually
every government department benefits from the data
transmitted from space. The country has perhaps the most
up— to— date communications network on earth. Radio/
television/ and telephone services are available in the
remotest northern settlements. Daily newspapers are
transmitted to the East and West coasts. " In addition to
what appears to be a fist class communications system/ the
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most spectacular and best known contribution from Canada's
space program is the remote manipulator arm» Canadarm. It
is this device states Day CRef. 8: p. 203 that/ "...makes the
U.S. space shuttle a viable tool." He further enumerates
Canada's space contributions by mentioning the ultra-violet
auroral imager for Sweden's Viking satellite/ and many life
science experiments for Spacelafa.
Canada/ based on current trends/ will continue to
look for unique solutions for conquering the dimensions of
her large landmass. In addition/ there will continue to be
further participation in the shuttle program along with
current plans for magnetic field modules/ i meter space
telescopes (Starlab// and a Radarsat for the determination
of the ice edge. In addition/ according to Day CRef. Ql,
Canada also plans on continuing to play a integral part in
the United States construction of a manned space station.
5. Europe in Space
" In 1975 there was flurry of excitement and hope
for future cooperation as the United States and the Soviet
Union joined hands in space for the first time. That soon
faded and it has become apparent that the United States
chief partners and toughest competitors are the Western
European Nations CRef. 8: p. 213." A Space World Staff
report CRef. S3 has shown that this competition has become
more evident as we enter the latter half of the 1980's. This
report further states that this will be continuing trend.
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This i3 due primarily to the Fact that the European Space
Agency (E3A) is involved in every field of space science as
is the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
< NASA )
.
- Spacelab mas built to allow the U.S. space shuttle
the flexible means of carrying scientific cargos into space.
The European Space Agency has taken the next logical step
and is studying the possible applications of spacelab
technology to the space station ijihich is slated for
construction in the early i990's. The Europeans have also
put a great deal of research and development into Eureka/
the European Retrieval Carrier. Eureka is designed to be
deployed by the shuttle for six months of independent
operations and then later retrieved. CRef. 83
The Ariane booster program uias started at the behest
of the French who feared that the free world launcher market
would be dominated fay the American space shuttle. The
success of this venture was enough that the U.S. cancelled
plans for a fifth orbiter. To date/ the Ariane progams
remains dynamic and progressive with follow on plans to
produce Ariane 2 and Ariane 3. This will give an increased
capability for launching bigger payloads into earth orbit/
further encroaching into the current space shuttle market.
A report by Mallette CRef. 113/ communicates that between
1986 and 1992, ESA hopes to field Ariane 4. Ariane 4 will
be an extremely versatile launch vehicle capable of placing
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2-4.3 ton payioads into trana-Per orbit. His report also
addSf that this will be accomplished using a ne«i/ concept of
mixing various combinations of liquid and solid fuel
propellant boosters. It is expected that the utilization of
the combination concept on the Ariane 4 tuill decrease the
cost of putting payloads into orbit by 60/C.
In conjuntion with the above two efforts the Space
World Staff report CRef. 83 shows that ESA has also fielded
mant/ scientific space probes* meteorological* remote
sensing/ and communications satellites. It also states that
while there is a collective effort on the large projects
previously mentioned many small endeavors av9 conducted by
the individual member nations themselves. To this end Rhea
CRef. 12: pp. 8-233 has stated that. "West Germany will put
*900 million dollars into the U.S. space station over the
next iO years. ESA along with Japan will provide scientific
modules and small free flying spacecraft. " While these
countries have the lead on the projects and they arrange
contracts/ construction/ and launch facilities the programs
still come under the auspices of the European Space Agency.
The next step for ESA as offered by Mallette CRef.
11: pp. 242-2503 will be the exploration and construction of
mu 1 1 i-pay load /mu 1
1
i-service satellites. These satellites
are based on ESA''s assumption that there is a need to
develop systems which can 'grow' in orbit as the demand for
the services increases. One such system concept is the
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'cluster'. The 'cluster concept' consists o-f several co-
operating satellites/ located close enough together in geo-
stationary orbit that the beam <i;idth looks like a point
source i'rom the ground station. This system has the ability
to grow as the demand increases and can be made more
effective by the ability to link all the satellites in the
cluster either by direct docking connection or by a
communications space-link. The power requirements for the
'cluster concept' are still in the conceptual stage but/ it
is believed that a satellite power module will be launched
first which will provide for all the future power
requirements of the system.
The Ariane booster program/ space shuttle and space
station participation/ along with current satellite
technologies will add immeasurably to ESA's technological
data base. As stated by Firness CRef. 13: p. 21] "...these
programs will actually be stepping stones to the
establishment of an autonomous European space complex in the
year 2000/ or there abouts.
"
6. Soviet Union in Space
The world's largest space program/ in launches per
year* shows no signs of abatement. The Soviet Union has
continued to ex p -and its presence in all areas of space
science and development in order to meet its strategic/
economic and n.atianal goals of prestige. Two decades ago in
a classified military publication/ Military Thought/ it was
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stated that/ " Mastering of space His] the prerequisite for
achieving s'ictory in war CRef. 10: pp. 22-263. " It is to
this end that the current family of vehicles were designed.
These designs support more than one hundred launches a
f4eavi and combined uiith a new generation of systems will
allow the Soviets, by the mid to late 1980's to increase
their space program both in numbers and payload weightCRef.
103. To understand how this is to be achieved it is
necessary to see how the program is broken down and what
levels of effort are being expended to achieve long term
goals in space. The percentages from the 1984 Pentagon
estimate indicate the directions that their space programs
have gone to date ar^
(1) Military Pay loads 707.
(2) Military/Civilian Payloads 20'/.
O) Civil/Scientific Payloads 10'/.
The Soviet Union in fulfillment of the effort listed
above maintains between 110 and 120 satellites in orbit/
which is about the same as the effort put forward by the
United States. Their functions include:
(1) Reconnaissance and Surveillance
(2) Command/ Control/ and Comun icat ions
T
(3) ICBM Launch Detection and Attack Warning





Along ujith this current e-f-fort in satellites/ the USSR
continues to pursue its manned space program. Their manning
o-f the Salyut space station is nearly year around luith its
primary mission being that of support of the military CRef.
14: pp. 118-1453. In addition to the military mission there
^ve many experiments u>hich seem to be a prelude for the next
phase of Soviet space development. It is expected that the
experiments will lead to a permanently manned Skylab sized
space stations which are to be operational in the next tujo
to three years/ and a very large modular space station which
will be operational by the early to mid 1990'5. These two
space station complexes are expected to house 6 to 8
personnel and as many as 100 personnel/ respectvely CRef.
10: p. 243. This will give the Soviet Union a very large
manned space presence by the turn of the century.
The ten percent that the USSR allots to
civil/scientific payloads has in many respects paid
tremendous benefits. The information brought back by their
planetary probes and landers have increased greatly our
knowledge of the solar system. In keeping with thiS/ the
Soviet long range planning is making good use of much of
this data in designing their manned mission to Mars in the
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i990'-5. Much of this future mission wiii depend on the
success of the new Soviet heavy lift vehicle/ ii>hich is very
similar to the old U.S. Saturn V. Once this heavy lift
vehicle becomes a 'working' reality then the USSR will be
able to launch into Low Earth Orbit (LEO) their own shuttle/
reusable space plane, and construction materials for their
space station effort. It is currently believed that most of
the i-naterial will be boosted to a location near Saiyut where
final assembly will take place. It is also of interest that
the large ship that will take the Soviets to Mars is to be
completed in space using the experience gained from the
construction of their space stations CRef. 16: pp. 20-243.
As can be seen the Soviets have very f-ar reaching
and well planned objectives for reaching their go-als in
space. Within the next ten to fifteen years there will
probably be many more surprises as this effort moves
forward.
7. Islamic Republics and Kingdoms
While the next group of nations do not re-adily fit
with the original definition of space faring nations they
will be include for the sake of continutiy. These countries
have the distinction of investing millions of dollars in
ambitious programs that are now coming out of their infancy.
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan has begun a 10 year
program that will provide space technology, research, and
development for the country. In addition. Rao CRef. 9: pp.
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10-123 i 1 lustratr s-5 that the program 'liill bs geared toii^ard a
multi-purpose civilian program plus a determined e-f^ort to
build a military launch vehicle capability. This latter
desire is based on the belief that India's SLV-3 vehicle
could be used against Pakistan in the role of an
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM>.
Pakistan's civilian space role will be much like her
neighbor to the east/ India. Plans are in place for direct
television broadcasting, plus point to point communications.
In addition; Pakistan has allocated 10 million dollars for a
LandSat processing station located in Islamabad. The ten
million dollars u/ill also include a complete upgrade of
existing ground receiving and tracking stations. There is
also a determined effort ongoing to establish/ The Islamic
Space Institute. There is an anticipated initial investment
of 3 billion dollars with the contributing partners being
Eangledesh (East Pakistan)/ Egypt/ Turkey/ Indonesia. and
Saudi Arabia CRef. 103
While these nations do not posses at this time all
of the hardware to make them truly spacefaring nations, the
framework and intent is there to utiliie space technology to
benifit them in the future.
C. THE FUTURE; INTRODUCTION
Space is a dynamic and vital endeavor which is ever
changing. In order to develop strategies to deal
a-Pfectively with the variations caused by change/ a careful
look must be taken into u;hat is believed to be the future.
With many variations being technology related/ a careful
analysis can be conducted if the advancements that creat
change are broken down into: <1) ''breakthrough''/ <2) and man
dr iven.
Breakthrough technologies are the random variables in
the equation of change which cannot be forseen. It has been
the pattern throughout history that major break throughs
have altered the way we view the world and how we conduct
our affairs/ i.e. gun powder/ discovery of the new world/
invention of calculus* etc. The unpredictability of these
breakthroughs and their ramifications is the reason this
thesis will not dwell upon them. Instead/ man driven
technologies will be pursued in hopes that it will shed some
light on future developments. In addition* it will be these
man driven technologies that will be a partial backdrop for
future space planning in order to meet the US Policy goals.
1. The Future: r'4ear Term 1986-2Q0G
The following discussion will lean very heavily upon
data generated by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. Due to the fact that the space station and
the shuttle transportation system (STS), have in part been
multinational efforts* it is felt that the data will also
reflect many of the ongoing international space programs and
be valid.
The US Space program plans to have in Low Earth
Orbit (LEO) an orbiting platform by the 1990'3. The
question remains what next? A partial answer was given by
Jesco von Puttkamer/ Program Manager* Long Range Studies*
NASA, when he stated CRef. 18: p. 3483/
the existance of the space station will not only
enhance Earth-orbital and deeper space ventures* but
also (as a unique space research and development
facility* operations base and transportation node)
enable entirely new initiatives for human advancement in
space not possible before.
Tabte 1
.
Useful Attnbutes of Space
W*tghtl«san«M (facilitates: special manufacturing
activities, construction of very large delicate structures,
and reliapilitv of operations!
Easy Gravity Control
Absanca of Atmoapfiara (unlimited high vacuum!
Ability to Utiltza Materials/ Elamerfts that cannot
exist in Earth s atmosphere (such as alkali metals,
sodium, phosphorus, calaum. etc)
Comprehansiva Ovarviaw (of Earth's surface and
atmosphere, for communication, observation, power
transmission and other applications)
laolation (from Eanh's biosphere, for hazardous pro-
cesses: little or no environmental, ecological or
localism issues)
Raadily Availabia Light, Haat. Powar (10 times rate
on Earth)
Infinite Natural Rasarvoir (for disposal of waste prod-
ucts and safe storage of radioactive products)
Supar-cold Tamparaturaa (infinite heat sink near
absolute Zero)
Large. Thra*-dimanaional Volumaa (storage, struc-
tures)
Variety of Non-diffuaa (Oiractedl Radiation (UV. X-
ravs. gamma, ate)
Magnetic Field
Availability of Extratarraatrial Raw Matariala (on
Moon and asteroids)
AvOKianca of Many Earth Hazards (Storms.
Earthquakes, floods, volcanoes, lightning, unpredicatble
temperatures and humidity, intruders, acaents. corro-
sion pollution, ate)
Potentially EnioyaMa. Healthful. Stimulating or
Otharwiaa Oaairabia for Human Well-being.
These initiatives are based on the usefull attributes of
space listed in Table 1 CRef. 18: p. 3483: von Puttkamer
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•further sfcate-s that based on long range studies of space,
capabilities will advance in at least three major areas as
foliouis CRe-F. 183:
(1) Easy access to and return from space.
(2) Permenant presence in Low Earth Orbit,
(3) Limited self sufficiency of man in space.
For an illustration of man's current progress in space see
Figure 2 CRef. 18: p. 3493:
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Figure 2. Man's Progress in Space
To achieve these goals the cost of getting into space must
be lowered. The development of the Space Shuttle/Space
Transportation System (STS) is a move toward the fulfillment
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ot phase one. The iscond pha^e will creat the capability o-f
sortying to geo-synchronous orbit (GEO) to aid in the
con-5truction and repair o-P large space objects and vehicles
already in orbit. Phase three should lead to a closed cycle
life support systems aboard space platforms in order to
eliminate the need to transport these items from the
surface.
In addition to the three phases mentioned above, it
should be noted that these advancements are linked to
certain key technologies. Based on current trends an attempt
is made in Table 2 to project these technologies to the year
Table 2. Progress in Space Technology, Past and
Proiected
System 1960 1975 1990 2000
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5 X 10* 2x lO'O 8 X 10" 16 I 10"
Energy storage
(kW-nrs/ib)
0.02 40 800 1200
Actrve circuits (per cubic
i»x:h(
4 120000 5x 10* lO'O- 10"
Soece-borne computer
speed looeraiions/ sec)
2 X 10> 5x 10« 3x 10' 10«- 10»
Launch costs 11 984$ /lb
to LEO)
20.000 3000 1000 100-300
Position error (m) 1000 50 1 002
Failure rate
(No hr/Mbits)
10-' 10^ ^cr^ 10-' - IC^*
2000 CRefs. 8/ 173: An important feature in Table 2 is the
man days/mission. Many of the construction elements of
phase 2 and 3 will be man intensive. The initial
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demonstration of mans ability to conduct these types of
operations in space occurred during the Skylab missions
CRef. 19: p. 4013i and the refurbishment of Saiyut 6 by the
Soviet Cosmonauts CRef. 21: pp. 202-2213. The human role in
space for the US Space Program is shou/n in Figure 3 which
further elucidates man's progression in the space
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Figure 3. Man's Hours in Space
With the demonstrated ability to conduct complex
operations in space. industrialization will soon follow.
Based upon orbital selection. (see Appendix AJ. there will be
corresponding industries which will be able to thrive in
those environments. Due to the many properties listed in
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Table 1/ it is expected that Low Earth Orbit (LEO) will
yield pharmaceutical product-Si high purity advanced seoii-
conductors/ unique glass materials/ and glassy metals CRef..
ISl. The ability to move to geosynchronous altitudes holds
the promise of large power generating facilities (due to the
maximum avoidance of earth's albedo (reflection)/ and
occu 1 tat ion > ; repair of existing satellites, debris removal,
and larger and more powerful direct broadcast satellites
CRef. 223.
With the help of the infrastructure of government
many of the above ventures will be private concerns CRef.
223. It is estimated that the world will be investing 75
billion dollars by 2050 based upon a growth rate of 2
percent CRef. IS: p. 3513. If the return" of seven dollars to
the economy for every one invested can be expected based
upon the figures of the Apollo missions CRef. 25: p. 253
then/ a two percent investment seems modest. The promise of
continued profits becomes even greater if one leaves the
earth's influence and ventures to the moon. A probable
scenario for man's push into space is illustrated below in
Figure 4 CRef. 24: p. 113:
2. The Far Future: 2Q00 and Beuond
The establishment of a lunar base has many
ph i 1
i
soph ical and practical qualities. While the esoteric
effects of settlement will not be discussed/ there is no
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Figure 4. Man's Expansion in Space
The moon presents many other features »iihich at this
point are more motivating. If the development of lunar
mining techniquesi after settlement, are successful then
metal extraction and the manufacturing of construction
materials will be the natural follow-on to assaying,
surveying, mining, excavation, gaseous oxygen production,
and oxygen 1 i qu if ac t ion CRef. 24: pp. 370-3713.
The lunar surface also offers an environment which
might have important scientific, engineering, technological
and research uses because of its low gravity, isolation,
vacume, sterility, low background noise, Earth visibility.
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loii} temperature variation/ law magnetic -field/ long
da»j/night cycle, unique geological -features/ and stability
•for large instruments/ facilities, and structures CRef. '241.
It is -for these last reasons that the moon is being looked
at as a future launch point for unmanned space exploration,
space colony resupply * / and further manned interplanetary
exp 1 oration.
Mankind's reach after making the transition from
earth orbit to lunar bases and probable colonies at L4 and
L5 seems to be just the beginning. Dr. Anthony R. Martin of
the British Interplanetary Society, conducted a survey
dealing i^iith space in the far term. The results of the
study were published in 1983 and serve to give an idea of
«i;hat may be in store. The answers given were based on the
assumption that man would have landed at least on the moons
of Mar ''5 (Phoebos and Deimos) by 2005. The results of the
survey are as follows CRef. 27: p. 310]:
i. First manned mission to the Jupiter system.
Median date: 2029
IQR: 2024-2037 (IQR: the interval containing
the middle 50'C of the responses)
» Space colonies will most likely be placed at L4 and L5
because of their inherently stable positions. See
orfaitology section.
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3. Large groups (greater than 1/000) living in
space (including the moon).
Median date: 2024
IQR: 2020-2030
4. Extensive use of the Solar systems natural
resources/ excluding the moon.
Median date: 2040
IQR: 2030-2050




6. Detection of an extrasolar planet.
Median date: 1992
IQR: 1990-1995
7. First unmanned interstellar probe launched








9, Colonization o-f an extrasolar planet by a
mission launched from the solar system.
Median date: 2260
IQR: 2110-2320
10. Development o-f Artificial Intelligence to a
level equal to that of a human.
Median date: 2058
IQR: 2020-2071
3 responses of "Never"




2 responses of "Never"
Whether these estimates will stand the test of time
is open to conjecture. The reason for their inclusion is to
shouj that there are space planners and engineers u/ha are
looking that far ahead. It is this insight and <ijill to
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drsam <i;hich will creat tomorrouis environment for US Space
Pol icy.
D. SUMMARY
From the preceding discussion it is apparent that the
United States and the Soviet Union are not alone in their
conquest of space. The projected benifits of being in orbit
have proved to be numerous/ hence the tremendous effort put
forward by the nations previously mentioned.
In order to solve the obsticles of topography China/
India/ Canada/ and Japan have embarked on ambitious programs
that will allow their dispersed populations the benefits of
communication/ television/ and early warning broadcasts via
satellite. These same four nations have also fielded earth
observation and weather satellites in order to manage more
effectively their resources.
The Soviet Union and ESA have much larger programs which
field numerous satellites/ both military and civilian/ along
with deep space efforts. As mentioned previously the Soviet
Union's Space effort has been mainly military/ and has been
the backdrop for their manned space effort since the early
sixties. ESA on the other hand has maintained a broad
program base with many joint projects with NASA. It is
predicted/ that the knowledge gained from these ventures
will give ESA the technological background for their own
manned space effort by the year 2000.
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The future in space for both man and machine will
continue to expand. The technology uiill continue in
basically two directions: (1) Augmentation of current earth
assets; (2> and further the ability for man to live and work
in space. While space in the far term is open to
conjecture/ it is apparent that there are goals in place for
man's further exploration and settlement. It becomes
apparent that the magnitude of these explorations/ and
consequent exploitations ans hugh. The ability of one
individudal nation to undertake the expence of one of these
operations will be prohibitory. It is felt by many that the
space ventures of the future will be a blend of multi-
national concerns and the governments under which they
operate. It will be through this cooperative effort that
man makes his greatest strides.
This current and future environment that the US Space
Policy must operate/ is highly competative; with the
competition being not just military but economic as well.
The continuing trends of these foriegn space programs will
only tend to exacerbate this situation. Therefore/ the
implementation of policy must be through future
technological developments coupled with planning for coming




Components of the model are the missions, jobs* or
activities the system must perform to realize its
objectives. As Churchman suggests, the components o-f
thismodel are designed, not according to similarity of
function, but according to similarity of mission. Once the
components are analysed, then a blending of orbital
mechanics and the axioms of Mahan mill ensue to illustrate
th is s imi lar i ty.
One of the vital components of the system model is that
of orbital mechan ics/orb i to logy . In order to understand the
relation of Mahan to space activities, it is necessary that
one have a rudimentary understanding of orbital mechanics
and orbital topography.
B. ORBITAL MECHANICS: INTRODUCTION
A discussion of orbital mechanics »i;ill include a basic
look at the energy relationships between velocity, motion in
gravitational fields, and orbital geometry. The discussion
will be extended to launch trajectories, co-planar orbital
transfers, and intercepts (rendezvous). The purpose of this
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analysis is to illustrate that space-flight/ in order to be
economical/ follows a least energy tra jec tory-*.
In order to analyse these least energy re lat ionsh ipSf a
look at the underlying principles is in order. From the
results o-f this analysis the various orbits will be brie-fly
explained along with the corresponding transfer maneuvers.
Finally a look at special cases will be conducted to show
that the in ter—re lat ionsh ips in the orbital geometries
remain constant.
1. The Foundations
It was on Christmas Day/ 1642 that Tycho Brahe and
Johanne Keppler laid the foundations of orbital mechanics as
we know it CRef. 28: pp. 1-23.
TychO/ the noble aristocratic Dane/ was exceptional
in the mechanical ingenuity and meticulous in the
collection and recording of accurate data on the
positions of the planets. He was utterly devoid of the
gift of theoretical speculation and mathematical power.
Kepler/ the poor sickly mathematician/ unfitted by
nature for accuvatis observations/ was gifted with the
patience and innate mathematical perception needed to
unlock the secrets hidden in Tycho's data.
Johanne Kepler's observations of Brahe 's data are listed
below CRef. 28: p. 23:
First Law: The orbit of each planet is an ellipse with
the Sun at its focus.
^ High energy trajectories will not be discussed due to
their high CEP's (Circular Error Probable). These high
CEP's are due to the small flight path angles flown by the
v e h i c 1 e
.
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Second Law: The line going from the planet to the 3un
sweeps out equal ^reas in equal time.
Third Law: The square o-f the period of the planet is
proportional to the cube of its mean dist-
ance from the Sun.
While these Laws are not qualitatively definitive they
explain a great deal. It was not until Sir Edmond Halleyj
brought Sir Issac ^4ewton's discoveries to light that the
mystery of Keppler's Laws were explained.
2. Newtonian Mechanics
In 1687 Newton published. "The Principia Mathematica
Philosphiae Naturalis". His discoveries ars as follows
CRef. 29: pp. 47-503:
First Law: Every body continues in a state of rest or of
uniform motion in a straight line unless it is
compelled to change that state by forces
impressed upon it.
Second Law: The rate of change of momentum is proportional
to the force impressed and is in the same
direction as that force.
Third Law: To every action there is always opposed an
equal reaction.
From the above three observations/ now Laws of Physics. is
derived Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation which is what
governs space flight as we know it CRef. 30: pp. 2—93:
Every particle in the Universe attracts every other
particle with a force that is proportional to the
product of the masses and inversely proportional to
the square of the distance between the particles.
While it is not the intention of this thesis to derive all
the relationships, a dimensional analysis will be conducted
to explain their correspondence to one another and the
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3ub-5squent ei^fect they have on the space flight energy
budget.
. a. The Universal Law o-f Gravitation
In the formulation of the Universal Law of
Gravitation Neu/ton introduced the constant of
proportionality* " G '
.
The Universal Gravitation Laui is
stated mathematically as follows:
F = GMm/r ^
In orbital mechanics it is the usual practice to
combine 'G' with the large mass and creat a new constant
^ \x' . This is done because the mass of the earth is usually
very much greater than the mass of the second body (usually
a satellite) which yields the new expression/ F = y m/r ^ .
In addition if we chose the Earth as our reference point
then the acceleration on the surface is due to gravity alone
which yields F = mg. Sy equating Forces/ F = mg = y m/r ^and
dividing through by a unit mass we find that gravity is
inversely proportional to the square of the distance from
our reference; g = y /r^. _^
b. Energy
The laws of conservation of specific mechanical energy
and specific angular momentum govern any body in space
following a free -Plight path/ whether it is a missile/ a
satellite/ or a natural body. CRef. 30: pp. 2-153
To explain this statement further there needs to be the
application of both Newton's Second Law and that of the
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First Law of Thermodynamics CRe-f. 29: p. 2773:
First Latj: A U = AQ - AW
Where: A U = The increase in the internal energy
of the system.
A Q = The heat uihich flows into the system.
A W = The work done by the system.
Stated simply/ the above equation says that energy can
neither be created or destroyed but only converted from one
form to another.
From the above equation we can show that the
energy put into the system must equal the energy out of the
system/ or that KE (kinetic energy) = -PE (potential
energy). This conservation of energy is what determines
whether or not a body will remain in orbit or leave the
influence of the Earth forever. The following is a
dimensional look at these properties:
The formula for Potential Energy is:
PE = - ym/r
To find the PE per unit mass we divide both sides
by ^m'.
PE/m = - y /r
The formula for Kinetic Energy is:
KE = mv2/2
Again/ dividing both sides by a unit mass/ »^
KE/m = v2/2
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From the previously defined relationships:
KE = -PE
= KE - PE
By substitution: O = KE/m - PE/m
or: = V V2 - li /v
Therefore/ the specific mechanical energy . 'E'/ of
the system is defined as:
E = V V2 - y /r
This very important relationship has rather
large ramifications for orbital mechanics of uhich the
following are examples:
As 'r' (the radius)* grows without bound, y/r
approaches zero leaving the energy of the system
positive. A positive energy means that the body has
enough energy to leave the system.
If the velocity begins to approach zero the body is
captured by the system. Since the body is gaining
potential energy it either never left the pad/ or it is
crashing into the larger body.
If the velocity needed for a particular orbit is
constant then the equation translates into a linear
relationship between payload and energy. This makes
sense/ for as one increases payload there is a
corresponding increase in the energy needed to place it
in orbit. If the energy output of the booster is
fixed then a larger payload will have to go into a lower
orbit. Payload is Energy!
c. In Orb i t
The preceding discussion has shown in a much
simplified way, the energy relationships which govern
putting a vehicle in space. Once in space/ the question
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remains as how objects stay in orbit given a constant pull
of gravity from the larger body. The answer lies in the
energy equation/ Newton's second law/ and the inverse
square law of gravity. Once in orbit the spacecraft has a
momentum which is imparted by the mechanical energy at a
particular orbital altitude. Newton stated that an objects
uniform motion should be in a straight line unless acted
upon by an outside force. The outside force is gravity, and
it acts on this momentum and bends it into an orbit around
the Earth. This change in momentum is exactly equal to the
gravitational pull at that altitude.
Another way to visualize this concept was first
put forward by Dr. Robert 3. Richardson^ an astronomer at
Mt. Wilson Observatory ERef. 34: p. 343. His concept was
that of a gravity well* around large bodies in space, see
Figure 5 CRef . 31: p. 573:
This concept fit in well with what Newton had
set forth. If one could visualize the fabric of space as a
bed sheet, with globes of proportionate mass to the planets





Figure 5. Gravity Wells Earth-Moon System
placed on that sheet* then the puckers created by the heavy
globes would represent the distortion of space due to
gravity. The li/alls of the gravity we 1 1 diminish as 1/r^ and
creat the boundaries of the orbits at particular altitudes.
As can be seen it takes more energy near the earth to climb
out of the wellf than it does at higher Earth orbits. If
this were not true, then the Earth's gravitational pull
would be infinite/ i. e. a black hole,
d. Orbital Maneuvers
With the -above energy relationships defined the
following discussion will look at orbit-ai solutions which
54
can be derived -Prom fchem. Once there is a selection made
•for LEO; GEO. lunar, etc. the problem is getting there, see
Figure 6 CRef. 31: pp. 65-663.
TRANSLUNAR SPACE
ITLSl
Figure 6. Space Topography (to scale)
Before a discussion is pursued on the launch phase
into orbit, it mould be wire to discuss the Hohmann transfer
maneuver. The transfer between ta/o circular co-planar
orbits is one of the most useful maneuvers in orbital
mechanics. It represents an alternative to high altitude
direct injection orbits. What Hohmann recognized in 1925
CRef. .32: p. 2181 is that the least ( AV) velocity change
55
required for the trans-far between two circular orbits is
achieved fay using a doub ly— tangent transfer ellipse. As
illustrated in Figure 7 CRef. 32: p. 2193 the radius vectors
r and r make up the semi-major axis of the ellipse u/ith vi
and V being the tangential velocity vectors at the
intersection betii/een the two ellipses. Therefore/ from
geometry
:
2a = r -^ r
1 2
From an analysis of angular momentum CRef. 33: p. 473 the
relat ionsh ip
:
E = - p/2a
or E = - y / ( r 1 -» r 2 )
^4oui solving for V in the transfer from r^ to r2
E = v^ /2 - y /ri
- y / ( ri + r2 ) = v^ /2 - y /rj
-V 2 = - 2 y /ri + 2 y /(r^ -* t^ >
= Y 2 C y /ri + E 1
What the last equation represents is the minimum energy
that must be added to the velocity at r to accomplish the
orbital change. By using the above relationship one can
also find the circular velocity of an orbit. In the
circular orbit r^ = r^ so therefore/ the final result is:
V =y y /
This expression for orbital velocity also has some
2a
Figure Hohmann Trans-fer Maneuvars
intere-ating conssquencss. One can see that the -farther a'iia^
froiT) the Earth one gets, the slower the orbital velocity.
This makes intuitive good sense as a satellite in LEO orbits
the Earth every 90 minutes/ and a satellite at GEO orbits
every 24 hourS/ and the moon (a special Earth satellite)
orbits every 28 days,
e. Launch
When the mission coordinators plan to put a
vehicle into orbit they use a modified Hohmann transfer
ellipse. The modification is employed because of
gravitational force loading on the airframe. The space
launch is conducted so that the payload is continually
propelled/ except for brief interruptions during staging/
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from li-ft o-ff to final injection into an orbit or escape
tra.jec tory
.
The initial portion of the trajectory begins
iiiith a brief period of orbital flight follo«iied by a gradual
pitch over sequence < prografr.med tilt) that deflects the
vehicle into an angle of 40 to 50 degrees from the vertical.
After the initial pitch over sequence the vehicle follows a
zero angle of attack gravity turn uihich gradually deflects





higure 8. The Gravity Turn
This procedure is used for two major reasons;
first# the thrust always acts in the direction of the
velocity vector* and the gravitational force which opposes
the thrust diminishes as the cosine of the angle between
them. As the thrust vector approaches horizontal ( G = ?0
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degrees) the gravity component approache-s zero. The
elegance in this maneuver is the utilization o-P the
aerodynamic properties of the launch vehicle, plus the added
benefit of using the rotational velocity contributed by the
Earth. In the last phase of the ascent trajectory,
corrections are made to ensure injection occurs at the
desired orbital altitude. As an example, imagine the space
shuttle sitting on the pad (rj)having an initial velocity
equal to that of the Earth's rotation (v^). At lift off,
energy is added in the wa y described above so that at the
top of its trajectory (transfer ellipse) the velocity is
Ji/hat is needed at that altitude. Again the equation holds
true:
=y 2 C jj/ri + E
f. Rendezvous
In order to rendezvous, the planner must take
into account the relative motion of the object already in
orbit. Once the intended movement of the orbiting vehicle
is determined, it is a process of manipulating the orbit-al
mechanics in such a way as to put the pursuing spacecraft on
a ^collision' course. The neui course is that of a Hohmann
transfer such that the minimum energy employed puts the
pursuing spacecraft at the point of intercept at the exact
moment it is at the top of the transfer ellipse.
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g . Or b its
The -Pollowing discussion will lay out the
topography o-P space as it is currently used for Earth
observation/ communications/ and scientific exploration/
refer to Figure 5 CRef. 313. The orbits av^ as foIloii>s
CRef. 31:?. 64 j:
( i :< Earth's Atmosphere: This zone extends from the
surface of the Earth to approximately 100 km.
This zone contains most of the gaseous atmos-
phere/ and presents a large impediment for
launching space vehicles.
(2) Low Earth Orbit (LEO): This rone extends from
100 km to 500 km. It is this area where most
of the observation/ navigation/ detection/ and
ultimately where the space station will be
orbited. This zone lies below the Van Allen
Belts *.
(.3) High Earth Orbit (HEO>: This zone extends from
500 km to 40/000 km and lies within the Van
Allen Belts. Currently Geosynchronous Orbit
(GEO), 36/000 km/ is used for direct broadcast/
some earth resources and tracking capability.
(4) Cis-Lunar Space (CLS): This zone extends from
40/000 km to within 100 km of the lunar
surface.
(5) Lunar Orbit/Surface (LOS): This zone extends
from the lunar surface to 100 km. This
orbital parameter is the dividing line between
CLS and Trans-lunar space.
* The Van Allen belts contain high energy particles
which lie in concentrated layers around the Earth. These
radioactive belts are concentrated between 500 km and 40/000
km.
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(6/ Trans-Lunar Space (TLS): This is approximately
390/000 kms from the Earth and extends to
approximately 1,000,000 kms. This arbitrary
line was chosen because the slope o-f the
Earth's gravity uiell is approximately zero,
with the solar gravity well being dominant.
h. Special Case
A special case within the earth-moon system is
the Lagrange or Earth-moon libration points, see Figure 8
CRef. 31: p. 603:
+ <•» + • +.




As can be seen there are 5 libration points about the moon.
They lie 60 degrees ahead and behind (L4 and L5), and 180
degrees ahead of the moon in its orbit <L3>. The other two
are in the Earth-moon line and lie 76000 km from the moon
61
towards ths Earth» and 71000 km away -from the moon -from the
Earth CRe^. 31: p. 593.
The libration points LI/ L2/ L3/ are unstable/
meaning that it would take an input of energy to keep an
object place there stationary. The other two L4/ and L5 are
stable. This is a theoretical result of Lagrange's
calculation of the three body problem CRef. 313. By analogy
we know them to be stable because of two planetoids in the
Jupiter-Sun system which occupy the same rel-ational spaces
which are stable. If one were to utilize the gravity well
analogy/ all the gravitational accelerations cancel one
another out. leaving L4 and L5 stable.
3. Summary
It is the physics of the. space environment which has
dictated our approach to placing objects in orbit. Due to
the extreme distances and the boundary conditions (gravity/
energy/ and resources)/ the approach used is the Hohmann
transfer/ or path of least energy. It is by the careful
balancing of the energy budget against the orbital
parameters that insures that we get the most payload in
orbit for the resources expended. By paying attention to the
parameters below:
1. Gravity follows an inverse square law.
2. Energy is constant/ it can only be changed from
one form to another.
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3. There i5 an inverse relationship between energy
input and system effect.
4. Payload is directly related to energy.
5. Spaceflight today is conducted using the Hohmann
transfer maneuver/ or path of least energy.
6. Orbits are chosen according to mission area.
7. There are stable and unstable areas in the earth
moon system.
8. The distances are great and the time to cover
them ranges from minutes to days.
u>e can perform a variety of orbital maneuversi so
consequently have a number of orbital options open for
exploitation. These options can produce the methodologies
by which ue can achieve the goals of US Space Policy.
C. MAHAN AND THE LIMITS OF SPACE
Another equally powerful component of the systems model
are the axioms of tiahan. The question is surely to arise as
to why these axioms/ and not something more contemporary?
The answer is two fold/ it is the belief of this thesis that
A. T. Mahan gave/ by analogy/ a clear recipe for the coping
for the initial stages of space exploration/ exploitation/
sovereignty/ and control; and secondly/ there is a
tremendous similarity between the conflict in space and that
of the seas/ see Appendix 2 CRef. 343.
The following discussion will lay a foundation for
strategy by utilizing the axioms of Alfred Thayer Mahan/ his
predecessors and successors. When this has been
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accomplished; these maxims will be blended with orbital
mechanics to provide insight into achieving the goals of US
Space Policy.
1. Mahani a Man and His Times
Alfred Thaygr Mahan/ was invited to lecture at the
US Naval War College after the completion of his first book;
"The Gulf and Inland Waters", in the Civil War. In the
course of preparing his lectures for the Naval War College;
Mahan somehow found himself; rose above a career which until
now he himself acknowledged had been nearly wasted; and
exceeded all expectations by developing his famous trilogy
to inaugurate a p h i 1 i soph i ca 1 study of naval history. The
Influence of Sea Power upon History; 1600-1783 (1890); The
Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and
EiT^pire, 1793-1812 <1892); and Sea Power and Its Relation to
th^ War of 1812 (1905) CRef. 35: p. 1733. A. T. Mahan wrote
at a time when there was a great expansion of the world
powers into colonial empires and strategic holdings. He
wrote to insure that the United States would not be cut off
from the sea and her livelihood by this very same colonial
expansion CRef. 35: pp. 174-1773. In order to achieve a
perspective; Mahan looked to history for answers. It became
apparent to him. that the past had a great deal to say to the
future. Mahan speaking to the value of historical study
illustrated that CRef. 36: p. 33;
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gely. though by no means
1 ic ts betu/esn nationsi of
requentiy culminating in
of sea commerce upon the
s ujas clearly seen long
h gos'erned its growth and
ecure to one's own people
ch benefits* every effort
either by peaceful
nopoly or prohibitory
led direct violence. The
gry feelings roused by
propriate a larger share/
tages of commerce? and of
o fuars. On the other
causes have been greatly
ssue by control of the
In his u>ritings and teachings* Mahan uias particularly
influenced fay the U/orks of Henri Jomini/ a SJi^iss theorist.
It was Jomini (i;ho first put forth the strategy of the
battlefield CRef. 37: pp. 66-67:.-
Selection of the theater of ujar , and the discussion
of the different combinations it allows.
Determinations of the decisive points in the comb-
inations and the most favorable direction for
operat i ons.
Selection and establishment of a fixed base and the
zone of operations.
Selection of the objective point/ whether offensive
or d ef ens i ve.
The strategic fronts/ lines of defense/ and fronts
of oper-ations.
Choice of lines of operations leading to the
objective point or strategic front.
For a given operation* the best strategic line and
the different maneuvers necessary to embrace all
possible cases.
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S. The es'entual bases o-f operations/ and the strategic
reserves.
9. The marches of armies^ considered as maneuvers.
10. The relations between the positions of depots and
the marches of the army.
It o^as the genius of Mahan that recognised the similarities
betireen Jomini'si ^Art of War'» and that of naval strategy.
With this as his backdrop/ Mahan formulated his analysis.
He condensed Jomini's f^iritings and divided his strategic
naval analysis into four interrelated areas; (1) The
necessity for central positions or lines; (2) The necessity
of interior lines of movement relative to central positions;
and (3) the bearing of communications upon the force's
ability to nvaintain itself and operate; and (4)
concentration of force CRef. 38: p. 173. While Mahan had
created a complete analysis he still purported that strategy
is all that pertains before/ 'contact'/ of hostile armies
and fleets CRef. 36; p. 4].
2. Strateqq: A Definition
While there (uere many examples cited in his ij;orks as
to how naval strategy was employed successfully, their was
not actually set down any guidelines as to how a strategy
was derived using the principles set forth. It was later
theoreticians building upon Mahan 's work that more thorough
explanations of strategy began to come to light.
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One such rigorous explanation o-f naval strategy was
put forward by H. E. Eccles when he stated that CRe-f. 40: p.
123/
Strategy is the comprehensive direction of the power to
control situations and areas to attain broad objectives.
This statement was further analyzed with the following
conclusions CRef. 40: p. 133:
1. Strategy is comprehensive-it aims at the whole
field of action.
2. Strategy is the direction of power. It should
not concern itself with operational details.
:3. Strategy deals with all forms of power avail-
able to the command.
4. Strategy deals with situations and areas, i. e.
peoples attitudes and behavior/ relative posi-
tions and lines of communication/ chokepo ints.
material resources/ combat bases/ etc.
5. Strategy and destruction are not synonymous.
6. Strategy uses destruction only where there are
no other means of control.
7. Strategy controls both the application of
power and the resources of power.
A key word in Eccles' analysis is/ ^control'. Control as
related to strategy is described by H. Rosinski as CRef.
41;p. 643/
. . . the element of control is the essence of
strategy: control being the element that differentiates
true strategic action from a haphazard of
improvisations.
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There-fore it is strategy/ in contrast to haphazard action
ujhich aiitis to control the -field of action whether it is
militaryf political) or intellectual. Strategy must be
comprehensive in order to control every possible variety o-f
response.
Comprehensive control of the field of action lies in
concentration upon the minimum number of key lines of action
or key positions from u;hich the field can be positively
controlled CRef. 4i:p. 643. With more rigorous definitions
of strategy and control as background/ application to the
principles as laid down by fiahan are in order.
3. Fundamental Principles
Due to the difference between sea and land warfare
Mahan had the formidable task of deriving the relations
between Jomini's axioms and his analysis. On the subject of
central position and interior lines he stated CRef. 36: p.
513;
The characteristic of interior lines is that of the
central position prolonged in one or more directions/
thus favoring sustained interposition between separate
bodies of the enemy; with the consequent power to
concentrate against either/ while holding the other in
check with a force possibly inferior.
M-ahan saw that a strong central position/ coupled with
interior lines of communications/ enabled one to assemble
more rapidly than the enemy on two opposite fronts/ which
allowed a more effective use of forcesi i. e. comprehensive
control. Mahan stated that the strong central positions
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were to be found at the geographical choke points/ i.e.i the
Straits o-P Gibraltar/ the Kiel Canal/ the Panama Canal/ and
others. With the careful connection of one central position
to another it gave access to many interior lines. The
maritime interior lines eluded to were found on the route by
Suez instead of the Cape of Good Hope/ and the Panama Canal
r.ather than Cape Horn. So there would be no mistake as to
what Mahan had meant he gave a further/ and simpler example
CRef. 36: pp. 51-523/
These instances of "Interior" will recall one of your
boyhood's geometrical theorems/ demonstrating that/ from
a point interior to a triangle< lines drawn to two
angles are shorter than the corresponding sides of the
triangle itself. Briefly/ interior lines are lines
shorter in time than those that the enemy can use.
Once the central position and interior lines were in
place* there had to be distinctions between their offensive
•and defensive characteristics. When describing the inherent
differences in communications Mahan stated CRef. 36: p. 523/
"Communications" is a general term/ designating the
lines of movement by which a military body/ army or
fleet/ is kept in living connection with the national
power. This being the leading characteristic of
communications/ they may be considered essentially lines
of defensive action; while interior lines are rather
offensive in character/ enabling the belligerent favored
by them to attack in force one part of the hostile line
sooner than the enemy can reinforce it/ because the
assailant is nearer than the friend.
While there had been much enumeration on interior lines
Mahan made further statements on the defensive character of
lines of communication. Mahan held that lines of
communication/ compared to almost anything else should be
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safe/ and therefore represent the most likely line o-f
retreat a force may ta1<e should a reverse be experienced.
In the direct application of this principle to naval
strategy* i.e./ that one must always guard one's line of
communications* Hahan determined that secure com.mun i cat i ons
at sea depend on naval preponderance/ especially if the
distances betuieen the home and advance bases are great CRef.
3S1.
With the establishment of central position* interior
lines and communications they enabled the controlling force
to 'concentrate'/ these advantages upon the enemy. While
Mahan gave many good examples of concentration* it was Sir
Julian Corbett tuho summed up the principle CRef. 42: p. 1183*
The object of Naval concentration . . . wil.l be to cover
the widest possible area and to preserve at the same
time elastic cohesion* so as to secure rapid
condensations of any two or more parts of the organism*
and in any part of the area covered* at the will of the
controlling mind; and above all* sure and rapid
condensation of the whole at the strategical center.
It is a visualization of the spider on a web that brings ail
the points Mahan has made under one roof. The central
position is the center of the web and the rays emanating
from the center are the interior lines which lead to the
edge. The edge of the web represents the maximum area that
can be patrolled and utilized If the ^q idev suffers a
reverse at the edge* the interior lines then become
defensive in nature and are the first lines of retreat. It
is for this reason that theu must be guarded.
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4. Strategic Positions and Lines
The strategical center, as mentioned by Corbett/ luas
different in naval strategy than in land ujarfare. Mahan had
learned from Jomini that every arsa of operations had its
strategic points. Mahan identified these strategic points
as; (1/ the base/ the possession of which provides first the
ability to launch an offensive operation* or gives logistic
support* or in the case of reverse* protection; (2) the
second strategic point is that place which the fleet
occupies. This implies that the fleet must have a superior
force CRef. 36: p. 46]. Mahan on the subject of bases and the
fleet at sea stated CRef. 38: pp. 200* S3
Notwithstanding the difficulty of maintaining distant
and separate dependencies* a nation which wishes to
assure a share of control on any theater of maritime
importance cannot afford to be without footing on some
of the strategic points to be found there. Such points
suitably chosen from their relative positions, form a
base; secondary as regards the home country, primary as
regards the immediate theater. The principle .
is that of keeping a superior force at a decisive point;
expressed in the homely phrase of getting there the
first with the most men.
In regards to what constituted a strategic position Mahan
proposed three conditions; situation* intrinsic strength,
and resources CRef. 36: p. 683. Uhen explaining what was
meant by , ^situation', he stated CRef. 36: p. 693,
Generally the value of the situations depends on the
nearness to a sea route; to those lines of trade which
when drawn upon the ocean common* are as imaginary as
the parallels of the chart, yet as really and usefully
exist. If the position be on the two routes at the same
time* that is, near the crossing the value is enhanced.
A cross-road is essentially a central position*
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facilitating action in as many directions as there are
roads.
Before the age of steam, these had been the intersection of
the routes favored by the tradeuiinds. With the pre-eminence
of steam these became the intersections of the great circle
routes upon the chart.
When speaking of intrinsic strength he stated that
it fi/as both offensive and defensive in character. Further
more, he stated that defensive strength depended upon
permanent «i;orks CRef. 36: pp. 70. 74]. Upon further analysis
of defense he quotes Corbett * who in turn takes a maxim of
Clausewitz and states. CRef. 36: p. 893.
When uje say that defense is the strong form of i^^v , that
15. it req.uires a smaller force if soundly designed, we
are speaking, of course only on one certain line of
operations. If we do not know the general line of
operation on which the enemy intends to attack. and so
cannot mass our force upon it. then defense is weak,
because we are compelled to distribute our forces so -ss
to be strong enough to stop the enemy on any line of
operations he may adopt.
It is this strength upon a single line of approach which
puts the attacker into a situation of continual movement.
which makes him liable to mistakes. This is the true
advantage of defense CRef. 36: p. 873.
Mahan knew that offense and defense were different
faces of the same coin. Only through a strong defense could
one effectively conduct a successful offense. To creat the
* Corbett used the term 'line of operation' rather that
communication.
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•strangth needed for this defense there had to be natural
resources. Natural resources/ u/ould provide more intrensic
strength than a position where they had to be brought in.
As a final statement concerning strategic positions Mahan
postulated that CRef. 36: p. 503,
Where all three conditions, situation, intrensic
strength, and abundant resources, sre found in the same
place, it becomes of great conseq_uence strategically/
and may be of the very first importance
From these strategic points, issued forth the
strategic lines, and those that u>ere the most important <i;ere
communications. The communications of which Mahan spoke
were logistics, and those with the government. Mahan
believed these to be the most important single element in
strategy, either military or political. It is the control
of these which lead to pre-eminence in sea-power CRef. 36:
76-783.
5. Bloc kade
While all this looked great on the surface Sir
Julian Corbett took issue with Mahan over m.any of the
definitions that were proposed. Corbett felt that there were
major differences between land and naval strategy that had
not been addressed. The first issue brought forth was that
of concentration of force. Corbett stated th.e fundamental
difference as CRef. 42: pp. 140-1423
In naval warfare we have a far-reaching fact which is
entirely unknown on land. It is simply this - that it
is possible for the enemy to remove his fleet from the
board altogether. He may withdraw it into a defended
7:3
porti tijhere it is absolutely out o-f your reach uiithout
the assistance of the army. No amount o-f naval force/
and no amount of offensive spirit/ can avail you.
When addressing the question of u>hether strategy is mainly
definite lines of communications he stated CRef. 423/
In land fi/arfare me can determine with some precision the
limits and direction of our enemies movements. We knofi;
that they must be determined mainly by roads and
obstacles. There is nothing like this on the face of
the sea to assist us in locating him and determining his
movements. Consequently in seeking to strike our
enemy the liability to miss him is much greater at sea
th.an on land/ and the chances of being eluded by the
enemy lo/hom we are seeking handle to maxim of
"Seeking out the enemy's fleet"/ with caution.
The last issue was that of concentration of effort. Mahan
had stated that you should keep a single eye on the force
you wished to overthrow without regard to ulterior objects
CRef. 36: p. 611. Corbett believed that you concentrated on
trade at the expense of the enemies fleet or vicB versa. If
you tried to concentrate on both you would compromise both.
Corbett stated at this point that/ ". . the enemies coast
should be our frontier. "CRef. 42: p. 144] This could have
but one explanation and that was blockade.
Blockade was the ultimate form of sea denial. Its
use answered many of the questions that Corbett had put of
Mahan. There were distinctive outlines of the coast and it
also produced a vehicle whereas one did not have to
compromise merchant shipping to sporadic enemy attacks.
Mahan had covered the topic of blockade but had approached
it from a different vantage but/ the results were the same.
Mahan believed that blockade could be divided up into three
different types: (1) commerce destroying; (2> commercial
blockade; (3) and military blockade.
In utilization of commerce destruction one could in
theory destroy the enemy through the destruction of his
livelihood. As Mahan stated CRef. 36: p. 923,
To attack the commerce of the enemy is therefore to
cripple him/ in the measure of success achieved/ in the
particular factor tiihich is vital to the maintenance of
mar. Horeover/ in the complicated conditions of
mercantile activity no one branch can be seriously
injured u;ithout involving the others.
While this was called financial and political ''commerce
destroying'/ in the military sense it u^as strictly analogous
to impairing the enemy's communications. This mas an option
open to small navies uiho »i;ere near their adversaries; and
usually conducted against unarmed and unprotected
merchantmen. The French called this action/ 'Guerre de
course' CRef. 363.
Commercial blockade on the other hand/ u/as the
complete closure of ports to ingress -and egress. It i.»;a3 not
considered a military operation in a sense because it did
not involve fighting/ nor capture. In addition/ it fjjas not
directed against military ports unless they liiere also
canters of commerce. Its effects never the less fi;ere
devastating to any economy u>hich it was brought against
CRef. 363.
The military blockade i-5 just 'iihat it purported to
fee. It is a blockade of specific ports ujhsre the enemy
fleet is stationed. This endeavor is accomplished by
stationing a competent force before the enemy's harbor
therefore interdicting the lines of communications to his
fleet. Due to the confining nature of the military
block-adei the enemy is un-able to defend the shipping so
vitally needed to maintain ongoing efforts needed in
'iiarfighting. This is seen as a u;ay that one could conduct
fi/ith least effort the interdiction of the enemies
communications. This again< is reminiscent of Corbett'S/
and Rosinski's comprehensive control and economy of effort.
6. Summar
u
Mahan. in his analysis of naval strategy; stated
that there were three things which led to successful naval
strategy. These uere: ( 1 ."' central position; (2)
communications; (3; and concentration. It ij;as his
successors «iihich laid the bases for more rigorous
definitions of strategy by using Mahan 's earlier dictums.
By utilizing more stringent definitions* (iahan's successors
demonstrated that strategy 'jjas comprehensive and must
possess a tijorld vieui. It is this comprehensive view that
allows the strategist to concentrate naval force on a number
of key positions or lines* with economy of force.
In order to concentrate one's fleet there had to
exiiat a central position and interior lines or
communications. The interior lines tjere time sensitive and
allowed the attainment of position sooner than the
ad\/eT^avii. This could only be achieved if one had naval
preponderance or a strong defensive base. The base existed
so that the fleet if suffering a reverse could retire from
its field of action along defensible lines of
communications.
While this theory of naval strategy held if the
enemy ujas at sea/ it did not hold if the enemy refused to
take the field and stayed in port. With this situation/ the
concept of naval blockade was explored and subsequently
divided into three specific areas: (1) Guerre de Course
(commerce destroying); (2) commerce blockade; (3) and
military blockade. The interrelating factor of all the
blockade systems was that of commerce disruption by
interdiction of the sea lines of communication. It was felt
that this interdiction* would bring an early end to the
conflict on favorable terms.
D. DISCUSSION: MAHAN AND THE LIMITING LINES
There is. not a reason at this point in time for there to
be conflict in space. But, Mahan has stated that as
resources and room to conduct operations become more
restricted/ then there (uill be conflict * over who is
entitled to the larger share. To avert this possibility o-f
being divested of sovereignty •»* Mahan stated CRef. 38: p.
200 3,
a nation which wishes to assure a share of
control on any theater of inaritime importance cannot
afford to be without footing on some of the strategic
points to be found there...
The questions remain as to where these positions ar&, and
can the US occupy them in order to ensure that its policy
goals are met? The following will be a blending of Mahan
and orbital mechanics in order to elucidate, by analogy,
these areas of central position.
1. The Panama Theory
In 1960, a seminal thinker in the affairs of space,
Dandridge M. Cole, put forth the Panama theory. The theory
stated CRef. 43; p. 61,
There are strategic areas in space—vital to future
scientific, military, and commercial space programs
—
which must be occupied by the United States, lest their
use be forever denied us through occupation by
unfriendly powers.
When writing a further explanation in his book, "Exploring
the Secrets of Space", Cole stated CRef. 44: pp. 265-2663:
•* Conflict as referred to here is economic, political,
diplomatic, and military.
*•* There is by treaty no sovereignty in space, it is at
this time free for all parties. Sovereignty in this sense is
meant current orbital positions (GEO), Low Earth and Geo-
synchronous inclinations, or altitudes.
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This is called the Panama theory in analogy with
the strategically significant Panama Canal/ since it is
believed that some areas in space will come to have the
same kind of importance in future planetary operations.
Some possible areas are the poles of the moon
(because of the possibility of finding water there)/ the
earth-moon libration points (such as the zero gravity
point between the earth and the moon) and perhaps some
of the asteroids.
What Cole was eluding to was Mahan 's dictum of central
position. In order to characterize the central position in
space* it is easier to speak of the platforms and orbits
already in use and then extend the argument into future
orbital considerations.
a. Satellites
Satellites by there very nature as "pickets'*
are afforded very little in the way of central position* or
defensible lines of communications. Due to current
treaties* satellites fall under the orbital heading of*
possession is nine tenths of the law. Sy the nature of
their function i.e., surveillance* weather* navigation* SAP.
(Search and Rescue)* early warning* communications* and
earth resources there are certain orbital slots which enable
to satellites to conduct their function better than others.
As more and more countries realize the benefits of space *
the problem of orbital crowding will begin to take place.
In addition* the earth's land masses are concentrated and
separated by large bodies of water. This means* as Cole
pointed out* that there are orbital positions of greater
value than others.
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This problem is further complicated by
satellites having little if any maneuvering capability.
These lijeak defensive lines make their destruction by space
mine rendezvous/ or that of an earth launched >jjeapon a
paramount problem of security.
b. SDI
The Strategic Defense Initiative is^ by analogyi
a military blockade. If the Soviet'Si or some other
belligerents Long Range Ballistic Missiles (LRBM> in their
silos/ can be considered to be ships in port then the
definition fits. While SDI 'i>ill be much like the satellites
ujith limited manuvering capability/ they do/ by their
location hold a central position.
Missiles/ based upon their payload and launch
sight/ must fly a path of least energy to their intended
target. The missiles expend most of their energy in the
boost phase climbing out of the gras'ity well. This launch
trajectory is predictable and takes time. Therefore/ as
Mahan had stated/ defense is the stronger form of taav if
there is but one line of advance and there exists the
ability to exploit it. The LRBM/ based upon the criteria
above/ have but one line of advance. By knowing the launch
site and the missile launch capability you can compute the
path of advance and counteract it.
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c. The Space Station
The space station being a manned platform has
some distinctly different problems. Until there is the
realization of what von Puttkamer labeled as phase three
(closed life cycle supports* then there is a meak defensive
line of communication. Upon the completion of phase three
then the space station has all three strategic qualities;
situation/ intrinsic strengthi and natural resources.
The space station also possesses numerous
interior lines of communications. Earth's gravity plays
po'iierfully into the space station equation. Due to the
gravitational inverse square law* a space station launch is
able to obtain a higher orbit faster than a vehicle launched
from below the station's location. In instituting a launch
toward- the earth/ gravitational acceleration becomes
infinite unless acted on by some outside force. The space
station has the added ability to be strong defensi'/ely.
Given that an object is on an intercept course it is
following the path of least energy *. By using the
previously presented arguments and knowing the path or
route/ allows the employment of the Mahanian dictum of
concentration. By concentrating force on the line of
advance it presents the opportunity to disrupt that line of
* This is dealing with only space or earth launched
vehicles/weapons and not with particle beam or laser
weapons.
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communication. Disruption/ should be able to be accomplished
by using an economy o-f -force due to the advantage o-f
comprehensive control over that line of communication.
d. High Earth Orbit
All of the above principles can be extended to
high earth orbit. It is the phenomenon of gravity* time/
and physical parameters which make being in high earth orbit
even a more viable option for control. It must be
remembered that it takes hours for an object to reach HEO
altitudes. It is this time u^hich give the occupant of the
central position time to react to the environmental stress
being added to the system. G. Harry Stine wrote in/
"Confrontation in Space"/ that the higher up the gravity
well the better. His analogy was two men* one at the bottom
of a well and one at the top. If they both throw rocks at
one another* "who gets hurt CRef. 313?" While the analogy is
simple/ it illustrates the principle aptly. The reason the
man at the top never gets hit is that he can see the path of
the stone and move out of the way. The principle of central
position on the gravity well and interior lines of
communications are even more pronounced in HEO if there has
been a conscious effort to construct lines of communications
between previously held central positions.
e. Li: The Ultimate High Ground
While it was mentioned that LI uias unstable; it
lies approximately 'adhere the earth-moon gravitational field
cancel. It has the added value as Mahan had stated as being
at the cross-roads of trade. The central position held at
LI/ 'iiould allow one to control the whole earth-moon system/
stable libration points (L4/ and L5)/ and the access to
trans-lunar space. If as Mahan has stated/ you have been
judicious and placed together many strong central positions/
i. e. LEO/ HEQ/ and LI then you have maintained the
integrity of the interior lines of communications/ plus
there are defensive lines to fall back upon if there should
be a reverse. If as von Puttkamer has stated that the moon
can be utilized as a resource basin for the maintenance of
space based activities/ then the instability of LI is a
problem that can be managed.
2. Summarg
The idea that to remain successful in a theater one
had to have a footing on strategic ground was first put
forward by Mahan in response to the rapid expansion of the
world into new spheres of influence. The similarity between
that and expanding into space wa s recognized and explained
by D. M. Cole in the early i960's. Cole recognized the
strategic importance of many areas in space and put for the
""Panama Theory' but/ the point remains it was Mahan and his
naval strategy which provided a backdrop for many of these
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later theorist's. The point being/ that Mahan has given a
recipe for space expansion which ujill fill the goals of the
US Space Policy/ and at the same time ensure that ms are not
excluded from exercising our rights in space.
The rules of physics apply in that* to place an
object in space it must follow the path of least energy.
This path of least energy is analogous to Mahan 's/ great
circle routes on earth/ which therefore give an earth or
space launched vehicle predictability. This predictability
is what makes a defensive central position strong since
there is but one path of advance.
These paths of least energy allow one to apply the
principle of comprehensive control/ and allows the
concentration of effort with the greatest economy. It is
for this reason that Mahan had a great deal to say about the
expansion into space.
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V. CONCLUSION: MANAGEMENT OF SPACE STRATEGY
A. INTRODUCTION
As the United States enters the 21st Century/ the keen
competition for limited resourses will accelerate. One o-f
the resourses available to help solve many of the US '
s
current, problems/ is space. This thesis began by comparing
the US Space Policy document fiiith that of our main
competitor/ the Soviet Union. While the need for national
security is paramount/ that is uihere the similarity in the
two documents ends. As the United States wrestles with the
problems of staying economically com.petitive with foreign
space programs* the Soviet Union is working at the
systematic and incremental exclusion of the US and other
international powers from space. This is a problem of
utmost strategic importance/ and what this thesis addressed
itself to.
The strategic management of space was examined with the
support of a systems model. The model was developed to aid
in the organization of the large bodies of knowledge which
are currently available on the subject of space. Upon
integration of the various pieces of the model/ a coherent
framework was established giving a visual picture of the
interrelationships. By visualizing the complexity of the
interactions/ it allows one to arrive at an appropriate
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stratagy knoujing/ that all the interactions have been
accounted for/ or taken into consideration.
The model used uias first proposed by C. West Churchman.
Chruchman 's model divided the system into five major parts:
<1) the environment; (2) resourses; (3> components; (4)
planning; (5) and control. The elegance behind the
construct ujas that each undifferentiated body of knowledge
could be tested in order to ascertain its proper place
within the structure of the model. Once the structure was
established/ the thesis analysed each constituent part in
order to define its effect on US Space Policy.
B ENVIRONMENT: PRESENT AND FUTURE SPACE TRENDS
The first area of the model analysed was the
environment. The environment consisted of foreign space
programs and the projected future of space. The foreign
space programs selected were those that could launch/ track/
and maintain their own space vehicles. The analysis
determined that the programs had several intrinsic goals:
(1) solving of current national problems; (2/ offseting the
cost of the individual space programs by becoming
competitive in the international booster market; (3> and
eventual industrialization and creation of a manned platform
in space. All three of these foreign goals directly or
indirectly impinge on current US efforts in space.
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The projected future of space was analysed to decern
u/hether or not long range trends could be anticipated. The
analysis revealed that the cost of current space efforts
tuould soon become prohibitive/ and that multinational
efforts ijiould be needed in the near future to make these
ventures profitable. It 'i^as also noted that the promise of
netu markets/ and a healthy return for the initial
investments would continue to be the driver of these
continued space efforts.
The extended future examined man's eventual resettlement
of the moon and continued interplanetary missions. The
prospect of almost unlimited resourses for space based
manufacture/ residing in the asteroid belt< would ensure
that the competition in space would continue for a long
time.
In order to cope with the complexities of international
competition/ and the military superiority aspect of the
Soviet Union's drive into space/ a look was taken at the
intrensic portions of the model. The resourses and the
components that reside within the systems boundry are what
can be utilized to help resolve these problems of strategic
complexity. While this thesis covered the topic of
resourses lightly/ it was considered to be the
strongest/weakest portion of the system.
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C. COMPONENTS: PHYSICS AND MAHAN
The components of the model dealt 'liith
orb i to logy /orb i tal mechanics/ and the maxims o-f Mahan/ et
al. The orbital mechanics section of the component piece
fiias analysed to demonstrate that spacecraft/ in order to
remain economical/ flew a least energy trajectory. This
Hohmann transfer was shown to be the same whether the
spacecraft was being launched/ making an orbital transfer/
or a rendezvous. It is this least energy trajectory/ which
is analogous to the great circle routes upon the planets
surface. Once the mechanics portion of the analyses had
been completed an examination of orbital topography was
conducted. This was undertaken to show which areas around
the terrestial sphere were utilized most heavily/ and to
give some dimension to areas that would be addressed later
in the thesis.
The second/ and equally important component piece/ were
the maxims of Mahan. Mahan/ had distilled Jomini's axioms
of war into three ma.jor themes: (1) central position; (2)
communications; (3> and concentration of force. Central
position was explained to be both/ where the fleet resided
at any particular time/ or a strong naval base or port that
could be defended.
A strong central position as described by Mahan had to
possess: (1) intrensic strength; (2) situation (nearness to
sea routes and lines of trade); (3) and abundant resourses.
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By possessing these three essential qualitiesi it allowed
one to have secure lines of communications.
These communications' were at the same time, both
offensive and defensive. The offensive/ or interior lines
allowed one to reach the crucial area of contention faster
than one's adversaries. But, should a reverse occur then
these interior lines became defensive in nature and alloiued
withdrawl in relative safety. These lines of communication
were to be guarded at all times due to the reasons stated
above/ plus the fact/ that strong central positions could be
linked together if there was adequate protection provided.
In addition/ these lines of communications provided the
means/ for a naval arm, to apply a concentration of force
upon the weak area of another belligerents defenses.
While all of what Mahan had stated looked fine on the
surface/ it was Sir Julian Corbett/ who stated that unlike
land warfare/ the enemy could remove his players from the
board altogether. It was this reality that sparked the
stategic question of blockade. Blockade was for simplicity/
divided into three categories which are .as follows; (1>
commerce destruction; (2) commerce blockade; (3) and
military blockade. While the first two types of blockade
were conceived to effect the enemy's war making capacity/
the third was designed to nullify the means of war making
altogether. It was this nullification/ which was seen by
many/ to be the true function of the naval force.
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p. MAHAN AND SPACE
Upon combining Mahan and orbital mechanics* the
analogous situation between space pooler and sea poti>er
becomes apparent. It u>as the purpose of this thesis to show
that through careful orbital selection one could achieve
either: (1) a military blockade; (2) strong defensive
central position; (3) and/or secure lines of communication.
With a strong defensive central position; one could utilize
the physics of orbital mechanics to secure ones lines of
communications. This is accompished by using the inverse
square lauj of gravity* combined with the least mechanical
energy needed for the operation. By conducting operations
this way it allows several things to happen: (1) depending
upon your placement within the gravity well; you either
achieve infinite acceleration when moving* toward a massive
body; or the ability to use less energy to achieve a higher
altitude; (2) by reversing this process you can compute the
trjectory your competitor must fly in order to reach you;
(3) and by continuing to follow this logiC; it allows one to
husband energy making materials which allows the presence in
space to be longer than the competitor.
In addition to the above arguments was posed the
question of strategic central positions in space; and their
locations. Cole's "Panama Theory'; described the choke
points in space to be directly related to position on the
gravity well (altitude); the earth-moon libration points;
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the moon/ and ths asteroid belts. The areas as described;
commanded the space lanes o-f communication, alioiiiing one to
observe movement within the orbital medium. It is the
securing of these points for one's own use Jijhich provides
the ability to remain competitive, ful-fill policy goalsi and
to ensure ones continued presence.
In donclusioni the systems theory model provides the
positive feedback needed to implement the naval strategy of
fla ban (as applied to space), and to control the outside
stresses of numerous space programs, and an unseen future.
It is this idea of control, u/ith an economy of force ujhich




The foiloujing will describe some o-f the engineering
criteria that are considered liihen putting a vehicle into
orb it.
Space System Pes iqn
1. Orbit Selection.
2. Number of satellites (constellation size/.
3. Definition of spacecraft payload (f^jhat tjjill
it be used for: mission statement).
4. Decision whether to configure for manned or
unmanned vehicles.
5. Si26< u;eight"» and configuration of sp.ace-
craf t.
6. Launch vehicle needs (gantries/ pad size/
type of fuels/ etc. ).
7. Ground support (tracking sights/ telemetry/
tracking* and control/ recovery systems).
8. Cost estimates.
Space Environment
1. Atmospheric drag (becomes less as altitude
increases )
.
2. Expected lifetime of the spacecraft (the
lower the altitude/ the shorter the life
of the veh ic le >
.
9P
Natural radiation (soiar and earth albedo)





When can the satellite -first see the
target or ground station?
What is the length of time the satellite
stays in contact?
What is the slant range to the satellite
(elevation angle)?
4. The higher the altitude the greater the
contact time and the angle above the
earth.
5. The -Poot-print ( beam u/idth ) upon the
earth. The beam diameter is larger the
h igher the orb i t.
6. The suathuidth cut by the sensor follows
the same pattern as beam<i;idth.
7. Revisit time in the orbit/ houi many times
the satellite returns to the same area
u;ithin a 24 hour period.
8. Sun—synchronous orbits using the shadow-
ing effects of the sun for greater reso-
lution of surface irregularities.
Reso lut ion
The ability to distinguish ttuo objects
as separate objects.
Factors that affect resolution are atmos-
pheric turbulence/ smearing due to space-
craft motion/ quality of the optics/ res-
olution cellsr or antennas/ and the size
of the optic S/ resolution cells/ or ant-
tenas.
9-3
Survi vafa i 1 1 tg
1. The higher the altitude the greater the
survivability.
2. Advantages and/or disadvantages of higher
altitudes include (perspective dependent)
;(1) detection limits and performance of
ground base sensors; (2> Cost of inter-
ceptors ( ASAT ) » increases u>ith altitude;
(3) guidance and accuracies of ground
controlled (ASATS).
3. Spacecraft must be structurally heavier.
4. Greater engineering problems due to EMP
(Electromagnetic Pulse) hardening.
5. Greater systems redundancy, which trans-
lates into larger u;eight requirements.
6. Cost is directly related to survivability
in general systems design and selected
launch vehicles.
Transmitter Ponjer and Data Rate
With space based assets there is a need
for
:
a. High data rates.
b. High signal to noise ratios.
c. Large bandwidths.
d. Low error rate in data transmission
lOexp-5 bps is standard.
e. High power.
f. High grade electronics with the late-




With current booster technology the over
riding factor is weight.





Maritime Force: The Analogy to Space
The purpose of this paper is to indicate some ujays that
conflict in space is analogous to conflict on the seas. The
folloujing are salient characteristics of sea 'a/arfare CRef.
343.
Strateqg
1. Sea Poujer aims to influence circumstances on land
—<i;here people live—and is in that sense
subordinate to land po'ijer.
2. Command of the sea leads to the exercise of sea
control/ which aims to influence circumstances
on land.
3. Relatively feu; major battles occur at sea/ due
to their decisiveness in potential or fact.
4. The overlap of interaction between land forces
to seaward and vice versa is growing because
of the increase in sensor and weapon range.
5. Bases are vital elements for their logistic value
and for the destruction of forces caught in or
near port.
Vehicles and Their Bases
1. Are large and expensive; few in number and
highly valued.
2. Are characterized by longer range sensors and
and communications than ground combat elements
so targeting and concentrated attack is easier.
3. Are self contained for long periods.
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4. Are large/ -fixed/ vital and must be sa-feguarded
as potential Achilles heels.
Combat Processes
Naval combat is attrition-centered.
Fir epower/ scout ing (Razved ka ) < and C2/ along ii^ith
their antitheses which attempt to inter-fere <i/ith
the enemy's three processes/ avQ the six ess-
ential processes o-f naval combat.
Maneuver of vehicles has become less important
vis-a-vis maneuver of 'ijeapons.
Time and Timing
Longer ranges of weapons and sensors creat the
need for great foresight and anticipation.
Explosive action and decisiveness characterize
sea battle/ with a time lag between the visible
attrition and the keq decisions which brought it
about.
The duration of the battle action tends to be
faster paced than on the ground. But if the
preliminaries are included/ the duration of the
battle may actually be slower^ depending on how
its beginning is defined.
P hMsioloqical
Sea sickness is suffered by seamen.
Life is at close quarters.
Life of seamen breeds attitudes characteristic
of closed societies.
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Sc jgnce and bng inggr ing
1. Navie-a have a long tradition o-f emphasis on tech-
nical competency. Army leaders think about stra-
tegy and tactics; naval leaders think about bet-
ter iiieapon systems that are smoothly operated.
Summar Q o-f Inferences Regard inq Space War -Pare
1. Doctrine and matters of leadership will be under-
appreciated in space warfare circles/ unless
emphasized -from the outset.
2. Combat will be infrequent/ but the capacity to
fight and win will be vitally important.
3. The influence of space systems will be under
appreciated by the uninitiated and the ability
to dominate in space (win a space war) under-
valued until the battle is lost.
4. In the building of a space i^av^av^ capability
watch for:
a. The importance of scouting (very long range
detection/ tracking/ and targeting).
b. Great anticipation/ encompassing great dist-
ances.
c. Technological ways to get to close quarters
such as "stealthy" spacecraft.
d. Attacks on bases on the ground.
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